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Abstract
This paper analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a
moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments
can avoid a bailout from the centre by exerting costly eﬀort. In this setting, a hard budget
constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high eﬀort,
and thus discourage investment that is socially eﬃcient. Thus, a hard budget constraint can
imply the opposite kind of ineﬃciency that emerges under a soft budget constraint, where it is
well-known that the common pool problem can give rise to low eﬀort and overinvestment.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of government, is
now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing countries. Moreover, it is
actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations such as the World Bank (Azfar et al.
(2001), World Bank (2000)). However, in many countries, fiscal decentralization is not balanced
in terms of tax and expenditure assignments, generating vertical fiscal imbalances. For example,
in 1998, across OECD countries, the average share of subnational government expenditure not
covered by subnational government revenues was 35.4%, with some countries having much higher
shares than this (e.g. Belgium, with 54%). Vertical imbalance is often much higher in non-OECD
countries, with Peru and South Africa for example, having shares of 73% and 82% respectively in
2001 (World Bank (2005)).
In practice, vertical fiscal imbalances are resolved either by centrally provided transfers to local
governments or by sub-national borrowing. But this may generate new problems. Indeed, it is
increasingly claimed that one of the costs of fiscal decentralization is that subnational governments
(henceforth regional governments, RGs) may face soft budget constraints (SBCs)1. Hence they have
an incentive to over-borrow, and/or pay insuﬃcient attention to the quality of the investments that
their borrowing finances. For example, Ter-Minassian et al. (2004) say, in a survey of national
experiences of subnational borrowing management, “Over the last two decades, the deepening of
the decentralization process has resulted in many countries in a significant increase in subnational
public expenditure and debt.” Similarly, Jin and Zou (2002) find, in a panel study of 32 industrial
and developing countries, that vertical imbalance tends to increase the size of government in the
aggregate.
The common pool fiscal externality by which over-borrowing can occur has been explored quite
thoroughly in the theoretical literature (Wildasin (1997), Goodspeed (2002)). The willingness of
the central government (CG) to bail out RGs who cannot pay creates a negative externality if, as is
usual, the cost of bailout is met through increases in taxes or reductions in spending nationally; other
regions will then partially finance one region’s bailout. In turn, this induces excessive borrowing
initially.
In the policy literature, it seems to be widely assumed that, because of this common pool
fiscal externality generated by a SBC, a hard budget constraint (HBC) for RGs is always desirable
(Ter-Minassian (1997)). Indeed, much of the literature is concerned with the design of institutional
mechanisms that will harden the budget constraint. For example, Rodden et al. (2003) and Ter-
Minassian et al. (2004) distinguish rules-based and market discipline HBCs. Generally, a rules-
based HBC is one where the central government places legal restrictions (or in extreme cases, a
ban) on sub-national government borrowing. A market discipline HBC (Lane (1993)) is one where
no restrictions ex ante are placed on sub-national governments, but where the central government
can precommit not to bail out a sub-national government if it cannot repay its loans.
This paper provides a simple model where a SBC, not a HBC, may be the only eﬃcient choice.
In our model, regions decide whether to provide discrete public goods (projects). The initial cost of
the project is covered by the financial resources of the RG. Regions can also, at a cost, exert eﬀort:
high eﬀort raises the probability that the project is good. If the project is good, it immediately
1Probably the best general definition of a soft budget constraint appears in Kornai et al. (2003): “A budget-
constrained organization faces a hard budget constraint (HBC) as long as it does not receive support from other
organizations to cover its deficit and is obliged to reduce or cease its activity if the deficit persists. The SBC
phenomenon occurs if one or more supporting organizations are ready to cover all or part of the deficit.”
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generates a non-monetary benefit for the region greater than the initial cost. If it is bad, it generates
no benefit unless additional resources are invested (refinancing).
With refinancing, the project pays a non-monetary benefit to the region greater than the ad-
ditional resource cost, but possibly less than the total resource cost. Thus, once initiated, a bad
project should be refinanced, even if it may be best not to initiate it. The RG does not have enough
tax revenue to pay for refinancing, but the CG can refinance a bad project in any region via a uni-
form non-distortionary national income tax. So, unless the CG has precommitted to not refinance
the project (a HBC), it will, in equilibrium, refinance it. Without precommitment, there will be de
facto a SBC.
In this setting, the SBC need not provide eﬃcient incentives for eﬀort due to the usual common
pool fiscal externality. Because the bailout in any region is paid for by all regions, that region may
not have suﬃcient incentive to put in high eﬀort. More importantly, when this is the case, projects
may be initiated in the first place, even when it is ineﬃcient to do so. So, a SBC may lead to
overprovision of the public good, a well-known result.
Our novel finding is that with a HBC there is a symmetric ineﬃciency. Now, RGs may be
overincentivised to provide eﬀort, as the payoﬀ to the RG in the event of a bad project is excessively
low (i.e. zero), as the project is terminated. Thus, eﬀort exerted may be ineﬃciently high. More
importantly, when this is the case, projects will not be initiated in the first place, even when it is
eﬃcient to do so. So, a HBC may lead to underprovision of the public good. Therefore, even in the
case where the CG can credibly and costlessly precommit to a HBC, under some circumstances,
it may strictly prefer not to do so. This finding is robust to a number of extensions of the basic
model, e.g. distortionary taxation, a continuum of eﬀort levels, as discussed in Section 5.
Related literature is discussed in detail in Section 6. Specifically, we address the issue of how
our model and results are related to the important papers of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and
Qian and Roland (1998). In these two papers, a HBC set by the principal always induces eﬃcient
behavior by the agent, whereas in our model, this is not the case.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the main results in the simplest case, where bad projects are ex ante eﬃcient. In this
case, it is always eﬃcient to initiate the project, even if it is bad, but this may not occur in
equilibrium with a HBC. Section 4 shows that these results, notably the ineﬃciency of the HBC,
extend straightforwardly to the case where, as in Kornai et al. (2003), bad projects are ex ante
ineﬃcient, i.e. it would be best not to initiate them if they could be identified. In this case,
not initiating a bad project can also be eﬃcient. But, in spite of this additional complexity,
the qualitative results on the ineﬃciency of the HBC continue to hold. Section 5 presents some
extensions and Section 6 discusses related literature. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The model has three periods t = 0, 1, 2 and several regions i ∈ N = {1, .., n}, with n ≥ 2. Each
region has a continuum of identical residents of measure 1, each of whom has an endowment ω of a
private consumption good in the last period, t = 2. In the last period, each resident derives utility
from consumption of this good and in periods t = 1, 2 may also benefit from a discrete public good
(a project), provided by the regional government (RG).
Projects have the following characteristics. At the beginning of t = 1, initial investment in a
project costs c. Projects may be good or bad: the determination of the project type is described
3
below. If the project in region i is good, it generates a non-financial benefit for all the residents of
region i of bg > c at the end of t = 1. If the project is bad, it generates no benefit at this date, but
requires an additional input of c (refinancing) in order to be completed at t = 2. Upon completion,
a bad project generates a non-financial benefit c < bb < bg.
We assume that RGs do not have enough resources to refinance a bad project and thus it is
the central government (CG) that decides on refinancing in every region. In that case, the CG
refinances using a uniform2 national proportional tax τ on the endowment ω. Throughout, we
assume that governments are benevolent, i.e. both regional and central governments maximize the
sum or average of the welfares of the residents of their jurisdictions over the three periods. There
is no discounting of future payoﬀs.
The order of events, and relevant features of the model in more detail, are as follows. At t =
0, the central government decides whether to commit to no refinancing (a hard budget constraint,
HBC) or not. If it does not, because c < bb, in equilibrium, it will refinance bad projects in all
regions at t = 2, i.e. set a soft budget constraint (SBC).
At t = 1, first the RGs i ∈ N simultaneously choose di ∈ {0, 1}, where di = 1 denotes a decision
to invest in a project in region i, at a cost of c of the private good. We assume that RG i has just
initial resources of c, i.e. no resources left for bailout, should the project be bad.
Then, having observed d1, .., dn, the RGs i ∈ N who have set di = 1 simultaneously take some
action ei ∈ {0,∆}, interpreted as eﬀort, which can improve the quality of the project. If region i
exerts high eﬀort ei = ∆, its project will be good. If eﬀort is low (ei = 0), its project is good with
probability 1 > p ≥ 0 and bad with probability 1 − p. To make it clear that our argument does
not rely on asymmetric information, we assume that eﬀort levels e1, .., en can be observed by the
CG and the RGs. Finally, the benefit of a good project in region i is realized and observed by all
players. Thus the project type (good or bad) is revealed at this stage. We take the cost of action
e to be just e. For convenience only3, we assume that this cost is non-monetary (e.g. disutility of
eﬀort for the RG).
At t = 2, if the project is bad, the central government, depending on the decision adopted at
t = 0, refinances it or not. If it refinances, the additional cost is met by the tax τ as described
above. Finally, the bad project’s benefit in region i is realized and consumption of the private good
takes place.
Under the assumptions made, the above is a game of complete information played between the n
RGs and the CG. We focus on the (generically unique4) sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game:
we refer to this just as the equilibrium in what follows. Moreover, as regions are ex ante identical,
this equilibrium will be symmetric: that is, whatever action the CG takes at t = 0, di = dj , ei = ej
in equilibrium.
Finally, two points are worth noting. First, unlike much of the literature, we assume that the
2To be more specific, we assume that the CG can neither diﬀerentiate regional taxes nor pay side-transfers to the
regions.
3 If the cost is monetary, then we suppose that the initial resources of the RG are just enough to finance the
initiation and possible quality upgrading of the project, i.e. c+∆. In turn, ∆ must therefore be too small to allow
the RG to refinance a bad project by itself, i.e. ∆ < c. Then, subject to this constraint, the analysis goes through as
before.
4This equilibrium is generically unique because the decision problem of RG i is always independent of the decision
problem of RG j : this point is further discussed below. Moreover, we resolve non-uniqueness in the special cases
where parameters are such that players are indiﬀerent between actions by adopting the following tie-breaking rules:
RGs always make initial investments and supply high eﬀort if they are indiﬀerent between doing so and not, and the
CG refinances when it is indiﬀerent between doing so and not.
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CG can commit to a HBC if it wishes before investment decisions are taken. This is because we
want to address the implicit assumption made in the policy literature, i.e. that if it is possible to
design institutions to achieve a HBC, then it is always desirable to do so. Second, note that it
makes no diﬀerence to our analysis whether the CG can directly observe eﬀort or only infer it from
the project outcome: it only has two instruments (the uniform tax and the commitment or not to
a HBC) to control the RG. So, for concreteness, we assume that eﬀort is observable and verifiable.
3 The Base Case
To make the basic argument as clearly as possible, for the moment, we make the following assump-
tion:
A1. bb > 2c
This assumption says that bad projects are in fact ex ante worth initiating. To further simplify,
and make comparisons with Qian and Roland (1998), we also assume in this section that p = 0,
i.e. low eﬀort always generates a bad project.
Consider first a social planner who maximises the sum of regional utilities, and makes all the
decisions that are above divided between the two levels of government. Solving the social planner’s
decision problem backward, first, note that as bb > c, refinancing of a bad project5 is always
better than termination. Thus, the net social benefit from low eﬀort, given that the project will be
continued, is bb − 2c. The net social benefit from a high level of eﬀort in any region is bg −∆− c.
High eﬀort is optimal if
bg −∆− c ≥ bb − 2c ⇐⇒ ∆ ≤ bg − bb + c ≡ ∆∗(c) (1)
This condition is shown in Figure 1. First, the possible parameter values satisfying A1 comprise
the region below the dotted line. In regions A and B of that figure, high eﬀort is optimal, whereas
in the other regions C, D and E of that figure, low eﬀort is optimal. Thus, the boundary between
regions B and C is given by the relationship ∆∗(c) in (1).
Next, we consider the investment decision. When ∆ ≤ ∆∗(c), the social planner invests in the
project if ∆ ≤ bg− c. But as ∆∗(c) < bg− c, due to A1, investment always occurs when ∆ ≤ ∆∗(c).
When ∆ > ∆∗(c), the social planner undertakes the project if bb ≥ 2c, which also holds by A1.
So, investment is always eﬃcient. Observe that, when ∆ > ∆∗(c), it is socially optimal to invest
and then to exert low eﬀort.
Now we solve for the equilibrium outcome, first in the case where the CG does commit to a
HBC at period 0. With a HBC imposed, there is no interaction between the regional governments
when they choose their project funding and eﬀort decisions. Each region i faces a simple decision
problem: choose di ∈ {0, 1}, followed by ei ∈ {0,∆}.
So, the (unique) equilibrium of the model is simply the solution to this decision problem for
any region. Assuming that investment has occurred, the benefit to the region from a high level of
eﬀort is bg −∆ − c. The benefit from low eﬀort, given that the project will be terminated if bad,
is −c. High eﬀort is thus optimal for the region if
bg −∆− c ≥ −c ⇐⇒ ∆ ≤ bg ≡ ∆HBC (2)
5Note that this observation states that the refinancing decision in any region are independent of what happens in
any other region. This is due to the fact that utility is linear in income and the social planner maximizes the sum of
regional utilities.
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From (1) and (2), obviously, ∆HBC > ∆∗(c) : as termination of the bad project is worse than
refinancing, with a HBC, the incentive to put in high eﬀort increases. This simple fact drives all
the really new results in this paper.
Next, we consider the investment decision. When ∆ ≤ ∆HBC , the benefit from the project is
bg−∆−c, so the region undertakes it if ∆ ≤ bg−c.When ∆ > ∆HBC , the benefit from the project
is −c, so the region never undertakes the project.
To summarize, the unique HBC equilibrium outcome is as follows. If ∆ ≤ bg − c, investment
occurs, and high eﬀort is supplied in all regions. Otherwise, there is no investment in equilibrium
in any region. This is also shown in Figure 1. In regions A, B and C of that figure, the project will
be undertaken and high eﬀort is chosen; whereas in regions D and E, the project will simply never
be initiated.
Finally, consider the case of a SBC. Now, a bad project will be refinanced by the CG, so the
region pays a bailout cost of only c/n, because the cost of the bailout is shared equally across all
regions via the uniform tax6. Note the common pool fiscal externality generated by the aggregate
budget constraint: any resident of i is aﬀected negatively by the possibility of a bad project in
regions j 6= i, as all regions bear 1/n of the cost of bailout of any particular region.
So, assuming that initial project investment has occurred, the benefit to the region from a high
level of eﬀort is bg − ∆. The benefit from low eﬀort, given that the project will be bailed out, is
bb − c/n. High eﬀort is thus optimal for the region if
bg −∆ ≥ bb − c/n ⇐⇒ ∆ ≤ bg − bb + c/n ≡ ∆SBC(c) (3)
Clearly, from (1) and (3), ∆SBC(c) < ∆∗(c). Next, we consider the investment decision. When
∆ ≤ ∆SBC(c), the RG of i anticipates that all regions - including region i itself - will exert high
eﬀort if investment is made and so no bailout will occur. So it invests if ∆ ≤ bg − c. But as
∆SBC(c) < bg − c, due to assumption A1, investment always occurs when ∆ ≤ ∆SBC(c). When
∆ > ∆SBC(c), the RG of i anticipates that all regions - including region i itself - will exert low
eﬀort if investment is made. In this case, the project will be bad and it will impose expected bailout
cost c/n on region i itself. So, the benefit to region i of investment is bb − c − c/n, independently
of how many other regions invest. Again, due to assumption A1, this benefit is always positive.
Hence, to summarize, the unique SBC equilibrium is as follows. First, investment always occurs.
Then, if ∆ ≤ ∆SBC(c), high eﬀort is made, whereas if ∆ > ∆SBC(c), low eﬀort is made. This is
shown in Figure 1, where high eﬀort is made in region A, and low eﬀort is made in all other regions.
Moreover, the boundary between regions A and B is given by the relationship ∆SBC(c) in (3).
So, summarizing our findings so far, we have the main result of the paper:
Proposition 1. When bb > 2c and p = 0, it is always eﬃcient to initiate the project. This will
always occur in equilibrium with a SBC, but not always with a HBC (regions D and E in Figure 1).
If the project is initiated, equilibrium eﬀort will be ineﬃciently low with a SBC and ineﬃciently
high with a HBC. So, there are parameter ranges where only a SBC is eﬃcient (regions C, D and
E in Figure 1), and also where only a HBC is eﬃcient (region B in Figure 1). One of the two is
always eﬃcient, and so the eﬃcient regime will always be chosen at t = 0 by the CG.
This is the key result of the paper: central government may prefer a SBC to a HBC, even if it
can commit to a HBC at zero cost.
6This is proved more rigourously and generally in the Appendix: see the Proof of Proposition 4.
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Figure 1: The base case
How does the relative size of the regions in Figure 1 vary with n, the number of regions? One
might think that as n→∞, so the common pool fiscal externality generated by the SBC gets larger
and larger, the HBC might always be eﬃcient, i.e. region B might dominate. In fact, this is not
the case. As n increases, ∆SBC(c) decreases at any given c, and eventually becomes vertical in the
diagram. This implies that as n increases, the region B where the HBC is the only eﬃcient regime
increases in size. But, on the other hand, the size of the regions where the SBC equilibrium is the
only eﬃcient regime (i.e. C,D,E) do not depend upon the number of regions. Therefore, when n
increases, there will always exist a parametric region of fixed size where only the SBC is optimal.
4 The Case of Dynamic Inconsistency
The basic argument has been made under the assumption A1 that initiating a bad project was ex
ante eﬃcient. This assumption, while convenient, is restrictive for two reasons. First, in this case,
it is always eﬃcient to initiate the project, even if it turns out to be bad, but initial investment
may not occur in equilibrium with a HBC. So, it may be that under assumption A1, the model is
biased against finding eﬃciency under the HBC. Second, an important branch of the literature on
the SBC, surveyed in Kornai et al. (2003) [KMR], assumes that bad projects are ex ante ineﬃcient,
i.e. it would be best not to initiate them if they could be identified. This assumption is in fact
crucial in the KMR model, for reasons explained in Section 6 below. In this section, following
KMR, we assume that:
A2. bb < 2c
Together with the initial assumption c < bb, A2 generates a dynamic inconsistency problem: if
a bad project could be identified ex ante, it would be ineﬃcient to invest in it, but once initiated,
it is ex post eﬃcient to refinance it. In this case, if p = 0, it is of course always eﬃcient to choose
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high eﬀort if the project is initiated7, in which case a HBC cannot (by assumption) be ineﬃcient.
So, to make the analysis interesting, we assume p > 0 in this section.
It turns out that, with some minor exceptions, the results of this section are qualitatively the
same as in the base case above8. So, here, we simply present the results, highlighting any diﬀerences
with the base case. All proofs are in the Appendix. We begin with the case of the social planner.
The optimal eﬀort and investment decisions are described as follows:
Proposition 2. When 0 < bb2 < c < bb and 0 < p < 1, eﬃciency is characterized as follows. Let
∆∗(c) = (1− p)(bg + c− bb) and c∗ = pbg+(1−p)bb2−p ∈ [
bb
2 , bb). If ∆ ≤ min{∆∗(c), bg − c}, investment
and high eﬀort are eﬃcient in all regions. If ∆ > ∆∗(c) and c ≤ c∗, investment and low eﬀort are
eﬃcient in all regions. Otherwise, no investment in any region is eﬃcient.
The main diﬀerence with respect to the previous section is that now initial investment is not
always eﬃcient. This is simply because now the option of investing followed by low eﬀort is no
longer guaranteed to generate a positive net benefit.
Now we solve for the equilibrium outcome, first with a HBC. With a HBC imposed, there is
again no interaction between the regional governments. So, the (unique) equilibrium of the model,
and its (in)eﬃciency, is easily characterized.
Proposition 3. (i) When 0 < bb2 < c < bb and 0 < p < 1, with a HBC, the unique equilibrium
outcome is as follows. Let ∆HBC = (1 − p)bg and cHBC = pbg. If ∆ ≤ min{∆HBC , bg − c},
investment occurs and high eﬀort is supplied in all regions. If ∆ > ∆HBC and c ≤ cHBC , investment
occurs and low eﬀort is supplied in all regions. Otherwise, there is no investment in equilibrium in
any region.
(ii) With a HBC, if the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, the ineﬃciency takes one of the following two
forms: either (a) if ∆ > bg− c and c ∈ [cHBC , c∗], investments are not made in equilibrium when it
is eﬃcient to do so; or (b) if ∆∗(c) ≤ ∆ ≤ min{bg−c,∆HBC}, investments are made in equilibrium
when it is eﬃcient to do so, but high eﬀort is supplied when it is eﬃcient to supply low eﬀort.
As in the base case, for some parameter values, ineﬃciency can occur under a HBC, and involves
either undersupply of projects or oversupply of eﬀort. So, qualitatively, the results for the HBC are
the same as in the base case.
Finally consider the case of a SBC. Again, characterization of the equilibrium, and its (in)
eﬃciency properties, is straightforward:
Proposition 4. (i) When 0 < bb2 < c < bb and 0 < p < 1, with a SBC, the unique equilibrium
outcome is as follows. Let ∆SBC(c) = (1 − p)(bg − bb + cn) and cSBC =
n[pbg+(1−p)bb]
n+1−p . If ∆ ≤
min{∆SBC(c), bg− c}, investment occurs and high eﬀort is supplied in all regions. If ∆ > ∆SBC(c)
and c ≤ cSBC , investment occurs and low eﬀort is supplied in all regions. Otherwise, there is no
investment in equilibrium in any region.
(ii) With a SBC, if the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, the ineﬃciency takes one of the following two
forms: either (a) if ∆ ≥ bg − c and c ∈ [c∗, cSBC ], investments are made in equilibrium when
7Because of p = 0, it is always preferable not to initiate the project (thus saving set-up cost c) rather than initiate
it and subsequently choose low eﬀort.
8Throughout this section we assume that the parameters n, p, bb and bg are such that
bb
2p
< bg <
1 + p(n− 1)
np
bb
holds. These conditions enable us to obtain clear-cut results. But if they were not to hold, the qualitative results of
this sections would still remain.
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it is ineﬃcient to do so; or (b) if ∆SBC(c) ≤ ∆ ≤ min{bg − c,∆∗(c)}, investments are made in
equilibrium when it is eﬃcient to do so, but low eﬀort is supplied when it is eﬃcient to supply high
eﬀort.
Comparing Propositions 2, 3 and 4 to Proposition 1, we see that both the equilibrium possibil-
ities and the nature of ineﬃciency are qualitatively diﬀerent to the base case, but these diﬀerences
are relatively minor. In particular, first, it is possible that investment does not occur in equilibrium
with a SBC. Second, there can be investment in equilibrium with a SBC when it is not eﬃcient,
a possibility that could not occur in the base case. This result is well-known and is driven by the
common pool fiscal externality that a SBC generates. But, the central point, i.e. that under some
conditions, the government may not wish to precommit costlessly to a HBC, still holds.
To investigate this point further, we can now construct the analog of Figure 1, to see in which
regions of the parameter space the CG may prefer a SBC instead of a HBC.
c
bb
2
bb
*c
HBC HBC HBC
SBCSBChbc
sbc
cbg −
HBCc
)(∆ cSBC
SBCc
)(∆ c∗ HBC∆
Figure 2: Comparison of regimes in the dynamic inconsistency case
In the parametric regions denoted by “HBC”, only the HBC is eﬃcient because with a SBC,
investments are made when it is ineﬃcient to do so. On the other hand, in the parametric regions
denoted by “SBC”, only the SBC is eﬃcient because with a HBC, investments are not made
when it is ineﬃcient to do so. Next, in the parametric region denoted by “hbc”, a HBC is optimal
because all regions exert high eﬀort (the socially eﬃcient solution) and thus generate good projects.
Similarly, in the parametric region denoted by “sbc”, a SBC is optimal because regions exert low
eﬀort, which is socially eﬃcient. As in the base case, one of the two possibilities is always eﬃcient,
and so the eﬃcient regime will always be chosen at t = 0 by the CG.
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5 Extensions
5.1 Distortionary Taxes
So far, we have assumed that the tax set by the CG is lump-sum. This is of course a strong
assumption: in practice, taxes used to fund bailouts will have distortionary eﬀects. Let us model
this in the simplest possible way by supposing that the cost of financing a project initially, or
bailing out a bad project, is c+ δ, rather than c. If this is the case, then the eﬀect on equilibrium is
simply to shift the ‘c’ on the vertical axis of Figures 1 and 2 upwards, while holding ∆ fixed. The
positive eﬀects of this are obvious. In the case of a HBC, this change will prevent initial investment
if δ is large enough. With a SBC, this can also occur, and additionally (because ∆SBC(c) is
upward-sloping, not vertical) there can be a switch from low eﬀort to high eﬀort.
The normative eﬀects are also clear from Figure 1 and 2. First, an increase in c, holding ∆
fixed, generally moves the economy from a regime where the SBC is optimal to one where the
HBC is optimal. Intuitively, this is because distortionary taxes increase the severity of the common
pool problem. Second, given that the CG can precommit, an increase in c makes the CG worse
oﬀ, because from Proposition 1, social welfare, given eﬃcient investment and eﬀort decisions, is
decreasing9 in c.
5.2 Continuous Eﬀort
So far, we have assumed only two eﬀort levels. While this is a convenient simplification, it does
have one implication that is not robust, namely, that one of the two regimes (HBC or SBC) is
always fully eﬃcient. But, when many eﬀort levels are possible (e.g. a continuous eﬀort variable),
generally, the level of eﬀort will be ineﬃcient in either regime. To see this, consider the simple case
where eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1] is a continuous variable, the probability of a good project is e, and the cost of
eﬀort is e
2
2 . Also, to rule out corner solutions, assume bg < 1. Finally, again for simplicity, assume
A1, i.e. that it is always eﬃcient not to terminate bad projects.
Then, given that the social planner always continues bad projects, he chooses e to maximize
ebg + (1− e)(bb − c)−
e2
2
(4)
which is maximized by e∗ = bg − bb + c; as 1 > bg > bb − c > 0, 0 < e∗ < 1.
Next, with a HBC, the region chooses e to maximize (4), but where bb − c is replaced by 0,
implying eHBC = bg > e∗. Finally, with a SBC, the region chooses e to maximize (4), but where
bb−c is replaced by bb−c/n, implying eSBC = bg−bb+c/n < e∗. So, as claimed, eﬀort is ineﬃcient
in either regime.
5.3 Towards Empirical Testing
Although the model is quite stylized, it does have some distinctive empirical implications. Our
model, along with several others (e.g. the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) model10, applied to
local public finance) predicts that a HBC will lead to less investment than a SBC. However, only
our model predicts that conditional on investment, a HBC leads to higher ‘eﬀort’ by the RG than
does a SBC. To test the distinctive prediction of our model, then, we need two things.
9Specfically, welfare per region is W (c) = max {bg − c−∆, bb − 2c, 0} .
10 In their model, with a HBC, RGs will seek finance only for projects that they know to be good.
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First, it is necessary to identify a historical episode where regional governments face switches
from a soft budget constraint to a hard budget constraint (or vice versa), preferably in diﬀerent
periods of time. A possible case for such an exercise could be Brazil. It has been acknowledged in
many policy papers (Burki et al. (1999) and Rodden (2003) among others), that Brazilian States
were, before 2000, under a SBC regime. For example, it was very easy for them to obtain an autho-
rization from the Senate to borrow more than their legal limit. Starting in the late 90’s, the Federal
Government launched a series of measures aiming to harden the States’ budget constraints11. Up
to now, the Brazilian Federal Government seems to be successful in enforcing these measures. Data
on state public investment as a percentage of state income do show a downward trend after 2000,
consistently with the theory.
Then, we need to identify empirical proxies for the level of ‘eﬀort’ in our model. The yearly
budget of each State’s administration that it is in charge with the monitoring of undertaken public
projects could be used as a proxy for the ‘eﬀort’ variable. Unfortunately, this data is not currently
available. Collecting it seems indeed to be a worthy step for future empirical research.
6 Related Literature
A key question is how our model and results relate to the standard model of the SBC of Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995) [DM] and KMR (2003). In these papers, a HBC is always optimal. The most
general statement of the model is in KMR; and we follow their exposition, but using our notation.
There, there are two agents or organizations, the centre and the manager. The manager has
a randomly determined good or bad project (with probabilities α, 1 − α respectively). Project
types are initially observable only by the manager. Each type of project initially costs c. Good
projects generate payoﬀs (rg, bg) for the centre and the manager respectively. Bad projects require
refinancing of amount c before they yield benefits (rb, bb) again for the centre and the manager.12
The order of events is: 1. the manager decides whether to present a project to the centre for
funding or not; 2. the centre either funds the projects presented or not; 3. if the project turns out
to be bad, the centre decides whether to refinance it or not.
As in our model under assumption A2, refinancing is ex post optimal but ex ante sub-optimal
(i.e. c < rb + bb < 2c), and good projects are ex ante optimal (i.e. bg > c). Also, there is a conflict
of interest between the centre and the manager, in that if refinancing occurs, the manager prefers
a bad project to a good project bb > bg. So, for high enough α, the unique equilibrium of this
simple model is an ineﬃcient SBC one where (i) the centre finances all projects and refinances bad
projects, and (ii) anticipating this, the manager presents a project for funding even if it is bad.
Imposing a HBC changes the equilibrium to an eﬃcient one where managers do not present bad
projects. So, in their model, a HBC is always welfare-improving.
In our model, the centre can be interpreted as the CG, and the manager as a RG. So, we
can see a number of important diﬀerences between our model and KMR. First, in our model, the
‘manager’ makes the initial decision to fund the project or not, and also pays the initial cost. Second,
there is no direct project payoﬀ to the centre (the projects are discrete regional public goods), i.e.
11Law 9496/1997, Senate Resolutions 40 and 43 and National Monetary Council Resolution 2653 controlled both
the demand and supply of State credit. In May 2000, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) and its companion
legislation Law 10.028/2000 (that amends the penal code and the laws dealing with impeachable oﬀenses) capped all
these control measures. Many observers agree that all these laws represent a clear signal for future governors and
mayors that easy bailouts have come to an end in Brazil.
12For simplicity, assume project termination gives both agents zero.
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rg = rb = 0. Third, in our model, the ‘manager’ does pay a share of the refinancing cost, via the
national tax (generally, 1/n). Finally, the project quality is not just randomly determined, but also
depends on an investment (eﬀort) by the ‘manager’.
Upon reflection, it is clear that the final assumption is the one driving our key result that a
HBC can be ineﬃcient. To see this, make the other three assumptions of our model, but retain the
key KMR assumption that ‘managers’ i.e. RGs have randomly determined good and bad projects.
Then, an ineﬃcient SBC equilibrium as in the KMR model arises if 0 < bb − c− c/n. Under this
condition, the RG gets a positive benefit from presenting the bad project, anticipating that it will
be refinanced.13 Under these conditions, as in KMR, the imposition of a HBC always restores
eﬃciency.
Next we turn to Qian and Roland (1998) [QR]. How does their model compare to ours? Again,
there are a number of diﬀerences, but only some are crucial. First, in the terminology of KMR, in
QR the ‘centre’ is the RG and the ‘manager’ is the state enterprise, unlike in our model. Second,
unlike in our paper, there is no initial project funding decision: projects are assumed already
initiated, modelling a legacy from the period of socialist planning. Thirdly, as in our base case of
Section 3, project quality can be improved from bad to good by an action taken by the manager
(eﬀort). Fourthly, there are two related assumptions on parameters: (i) given a SBC, the manager
wishes to put in low eﬀort i.e. bg−∆ < bb in our notation14; (ii) the gains to the manager from low
eﬀort are exceeded by the cost to RG in terms of lower payoﬀs15. So, from these two assumptions,
in the QR model, the possibility of the SBC being optimal is ruled out by assumption. This means,
of course, that a HBC can never be ineﬃcient in their model. This seems to us very restrictive.
Finally, there is also a small public finance literature16 explaining why, in some circumstances,
a SBC may be optimal. This class of models assumes (unlike us) that public projects have positive
inter-regional spillovers, and (somewhat17 like us), in equilibrium with a SBC, RGs anticipate that
additional expenditure will be partially subsidized by transfers from other regions. With positive
spillovers, this common pool externality oﬀsets the failure to internalize inter-regional spillovers18,
and may lead to the SBC outcome being more eﬃcient. This is rather diﬀerent from our story: we
do not need inter-regional spillovers from projects to yield the conclusion that only the SBC can
be eﬃcient.
7 Conclusions
This paper has shown that, in the context of a model of fiscal federalism, hard budget constraints
do not necessarily ‘solve’ the problems generated by soft budget constraints. Our argument was
the following. First, by definition, a hard budget constraint necessarily implies that ‘bad’ invest-
13The only other equilibrium is where 0 > bb − c(1 + 1n ), in which case only good projects are presented. Then
there is no need for a HBC to restore eﬃciency.
14 In their notation, Bs > Bq, where implicitly, Bq is the benefit net of any cost of eﬀort.
15This is implicit in this statement: “Notice that because EH > ES , hard budget constraints would yield more
tax revenue and thus allow a higher welfare level. Thus, the government would prefer a commitment to no bailout”
(p1149). In their paper, EH , ES denote net transfers from the enterprise to RG.
16Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan et al. (2000), Köthenbürger (2004).
17 In this class of models, the mechanism is slightly diﬀerent : grants are chosen ex post by the central government
to equalize the marginal utility of private consumption between regions.
18Remarkably, if the spillovers are such that the regional public good is eﬀectively a contribution to a pure national
public good, the two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other and public good provision is eﬃcient, even in the absence of a
matching grant instrument at the federal level (Caplan et al. (2000)).
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ment projects will be terminated, when ex post, it would be desirable to continue them through
additional financing. Now suppose that by exerting some eﬀort, regional governments can lower
the probability that projects are ‘bad’. Then, with a hard budget constraint, regional governments
are overincentivised to provide eﬀort, as payoﬀ to them in the event of a bad project is excessively
low. Thus, eﬀort exerted may be ineﬃciently high. More importantly, when this is the case, some
projects will not be initiated in the first place, even when it is eﬃcient to do so. So, a hard budget
constraint may lead to underinvestment. The argument developed in this paper is quite general, and
may apply to areas other than fiscal federalism, like, for example, in a lender-borrower relationship
or in a government-public enterprise regulatory context. That is a topic for future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The net social benefit from high eﬀort in any region is bg − ∆ − c.
For a social planner, refinancing is always better. So the net social benefit from low eﬀort, given
that the project will be continued, is pbg + (1 − p)(bb − c) − c. Thus high eﬀort is optimal if
∆ ≤ (1 − p)(bg + c − bb) = ∆∗(c). Next, consider the decision whether to invest in the project.
When ∆ ≤ ∆∗(c), the social planner undertakes the project if ∆ ≤ bg − c. When ∆ > ∆∗(c), the
social planner undertakes the project if pbg + (1 − p)(bb − c) − c ≥ 0, or c ≤ pbg+(1−p)bb2−p = c∗. By
assumption, c∗ lies between bb2 and bb ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove (i), note first that high eﬀort is optimal for the region
if ∆ ≤ (1 − p)bg = ∆HBC . Next, consider the decision whether to initiate the project. When
∆ ≤ ∆HBC , the region undertakes the project if ∆ ≤ bg − c < ∆HBC . When ∆ > ∆HBC , the
region undertakes the project if c ≤ pbg = cHBC . Comparing critical values ∆∗(c),∆HBC and
c∗, cHBC , and noting that cHBC < c∗, ∆∗(c) < ∆HBC , we can establish part (ii) ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove (i) note first that conditional on d = (di)i∈N , e = (ei)i∈N , the
expected utility of a resident of region i is
ui(d, e) = ω(1−Eτ) + di[p(ei)bg + (1− p(ei))bb]− ei − dic (5)
where
p(e) =
½
1 if e = ∆
p if e = 0
(6)
is the probability of a good project as a function of e and Eτ is the expected tax. The latter
satisfies, from the CG budget constraint:
nωEτ = c
nP
j=1
dj(1− p(ej)) (7)
That is, the tax must fund refinancing of a project in every region j in the event that it is bad,
which occurs with probability dj(1− p(ej)). As this tax is uniform and wealth ω is immobile, the
base of the tax τ is simply nω. Substituting (6) and (7) into (5), we obtain, supressing the constant
ω:
ui(d, e) = di[p(ei)bg + (1− p(ei))bb]−
c
n
nP
j=1
dj(1− p(ej))− ei − dic (8)
=
n
di[p(ei)bg + (1− p(ei))(bb −
c
n
)]− ei − dic
o
− c
n
P
j 6=i
dj(1− p(ej))
By inspection of (8), the efect of di, ei on ui - measured by the bracketed term - is independent of
dj , ej . So we can analyse the choice of di, ei just for a representative region i.
Assuming di = 1, the gain to region i from high relative to low eﬀort is easily calculated from
(8) and (6) to be (1− p)(bg − bb + cn)−∆. So, for region i, it is a dominant strategy to put in high
eﬀort in project implementation if
∆ ≤ (1− p)(bg − bb +
c
n
) = ∆SBC(c)
and low eﬀort otherwise, conditional on the project having been initiated.
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Now we turn to the project initiation decision. First, assume that ∆ ≤ ∆SBC(c). Then, the
government of region i anticipates that p(ei) = 1. From (8), the gain to region i from initiating a
project is bg −∆− c. So, for region i is a dominant strategy to invest if ∆ ≤ bg − c.
Now suppose that ∆ > ∆SBC(c). Then the government of region i anticipates that p(ei) = p.
From (8), the benefit to region i of di = 1 is
p(bg − c) + (1− p)(bb − c−
c
n
) (9)
So, for any region it is a dominant strategy to invest if (9) is positive, or
c ≤ n[pbg + (1− p)bb]
n+ 1− p = c
SBC
as claimed.
Comparing critical values ∆∗(c),∆SBC(c) and c∗, cSBC , and noting that cSBC > c∗, ∆∗(c) >
∆SBC(c), we can establish part (ii) ¤
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